With China's ambitions in the Western Pacific now impossible to ignore, U.S. service personnel need to revisit their wartime experiences in the region. Peleliu was the most difficult of the amphibious landings. What happened at the waterline caught the Americans completely by surprise . Then, the island's interior contained some of the most difficult terrain anywhere in the world. How the Marines were able to deal tactically  with its heavy compartmentalization is not apparent from the official war chronicles. It's quite exciting (and useful to current professionals). None of the modern-day gadgetry would have helped to secure it. "Resource Management Librarian ... excited to add it ['Peleliu Progress'] to our collection. He said that all ... previous books were VERY well researched.... Thank you ... for adding more knowledge ... to help train current and future Special Operations Soldiers!" -- USAJFKSWCS Library, July 2021 "There are many lessons to be learned from our hard-fought battles of WWII.... [A] war with China would be nothing like anything we've seen ... [lately], so we'll need be prepared on ... [tiny-element] infantry tactics." -- 2nd MarDiv battalion commander, July 2021 "China is militarizing the South China Sea, pushing away the claims of other countries, and threatening worldwide shipping." -- Tactics and Preparedness, November 2021 "Have our [present-day] combat arms units, particularly the infantry units, become overloaded, road-bound, operating-base tethered, distracted by social changes, over-reliant on technology, and prevented from experiencing stressful training to the extent that facing a battle like Peleliu would result in a disastrous outcome (former Head of CENTCOM)?"-- Gen. Anthony C. Zinni USMC(Ret.), July 2021 "Peleliu introduced new Japanese strategies to defeat traditional Marine Corps amphibious capabilities. Ultimately, the Marines won because of their relentless courage and 'boots on the ground' adaptability to war. John Poole's Peleliu Progress describes yesterday's lessons as today's forces adapt to future warfare (former 1st Marine Division)." -- Maj.Gen. John H. Admire USMC(Ret.), July 2021 "[T]he American military has become more and more dependent upon technology, such as AUVs [autonomous underwater vehicles] and satellites, both of which will prove of little . . . [value] against the Chinese use of caves along it's Pacific Rim and offshore islands (retired U.S. Army historian of 35 years)." -- Kim Holien, July 2021 "In the not too distant future, military analysts will look back at John's books and ask 'Why didn't we listen?' His warning is clear: material dominance masks . . . American weakness in small-unit tactics (founder/editor 'Red Team Journal')." -- Dr. Mark Mateski, July 2021 "[T]he hard-earned lessons of our forebearers will provide us with invaluable insight into the future of warfare in the Pacific." -- Infantry Bn. Commander, Schofield Barracks, September 2021 After serving as a rifle company commander for eight months in Vietnam, Poole completed his 28-year USMC career as the SNCOIC of the 3rd Marine Division Squad Leaders School on Okinawa in 1993. Since that time, he has researched the small-unit tactics of America's various enemies and written 20 other tactics/intel. manual supplements. He has been to Communist China (twice), North Korea, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Venezuela, Pakistan (twice), Bangladesh, Malaysia, Iran, Lebanon, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, Morocco, and Russia. Between early tours in the Marine Corps (from 1969 to 1971), he served as a criminal investigator with the Illinois Bureau of Investigation. Poole is one of the very few living Americans with an extensive enough background to know how to fix the ongoing tactical shortfall within the U.S. military. After some 60 multi-day training sessions at different active-duty battalions and schools, he has developed, tested, and refined its solution (through supplementary "bottom-up" instruction). He has also become adept at the now virtually lost art of field training light infantrymen (those who are able to do well on their own in the absence of orders).